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INCOME TAX - SECTION 162 - TRAVELING EXPENSE DE-
DUCTIONS - ABSENT PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS,
TRAVELING SALESPERSON'S TAX HOME IS GEOGRAPHIC
CONCENTRATION OF INCOME-PRODUCING ACTIVITY.
Daly v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Daly v. Commissioner,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit created an arbitrary tax home for a traveling sales-
person who maintained no office or otherwise definable principal place
of business within his assigned territory. The Fourth Circuit has thus
expanded the already fictionalized concept of treating a place of busi-
ness as a home for tax purposes. Traditionally, when no definable
principal place of business existed courts deemed the tax home to be
the business site closest to the taxpayer's residence. This casenote-ana-
lyzes the effect of the Fourth Circuit's ruling on traveling expense de-
ductions and suggests a possible alternative to determining the tax
home of the traveling taxpayer.
II. FACTUAL SETTING
Lee Daly, a traveling salesman for the Myrtle Desk Company of
North Carolina, maintained a family home and office in McLean, Vir-
ginia.2 Since 1965, he had been assigned by his employer to a tri-state
territory consisting of eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Dela-
ware. Daly made weekly trips to his territory, leaving McLean early
Tuesday morning, staying overnight in or around the Philadelphia area
for two nights, and returning to Virginia on Thursday evening. He
spent Mondays and Fridays completing paperwork and other inciden-
tal tasks in his at-home office. Daly was not required by his employer
to maintain an office at home nor within his territory. He was not re-
imbursed for any expenses incurred in connection with his employment
and was compensated on a commission basis.
The petitioners, Lee and Rosemarie Daly, remained in Virginia
primarily to enable Mrs. Daly to keep her job as manager of the Ge-
orgetown Uniform Company in Washington, D.C.3 On their joint in-
come tax return in 1975, the Dalys deducted as traveling expenses
under section 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 the cost
1. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
2. Id at 254.
3. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 194 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
4. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references will be to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended. Section 162 provides in pertinent part:
(a) IN GENERAL - There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including. ...
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodg-
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of the husband's transportation between the McLean residence and
Philadelphia, and meals and lodging while in the Philadelphia area.
The deductions were disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue as being personal in nature and therefore nondeductible. The
Dalys petitioned the Tax Court of the United States which upheld the
Commissioner's assessment of a deficiency.' A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Daly
was entitled to designate McLean as his tax home in the absence of an
office or residence in Philadelphia.6  Upon petition of the Commis-
sioner, the appeal was reheard by the court sitting en banc7 and the
judgment of the tax court was affirmed.'
III. HISTORY OF TRAVELING EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS
A. Legislative History
Deductions for traveling expenses were first provided for in the
Revenue Act of 19139 and later expanded in the Revenue Act of 1918,
which allowed a deduction for ordinary and necessary traveling ex-
penses incurred while carrying on a business.' 0 In one of the first ad-
ministrative rulings issued by the Treasury Department regarding this
section of the 1918 Act, meal and lodging expenses were deductible only
to the extent they exceeded similar amounts that would have been
spent by the taxpayer while at home. I I The Revenue Act of 1921 liber-
alized the statute by allowing deductions for "traveling expenses (in-
cluding the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business."
1 2
Legislative history indicates that the amendment contained in the
1921 statute was enacted to allow traveling salespersons proper deduc-
tions for meals, lodging and transportation, but the context in which
the word "home" was used was not made clear.' 3 The text of the cur-
ing other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the cir-
cumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business ...
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
5. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
6. Daly v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
7. En banc refers to a session where the entire membership of the court will partici-
pate in the decision, rather than the regular quorum. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
472 (5th ed. 1979).
8. Daly v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir. 1981)(en banc).
9. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 167.
10. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214 (a)(1), 40 Stat. 1066.
11. T.D. 3101, 1920-3 C.B. 191.
12. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(1), 42 Stat. 239.
13. 61 CONG. REC. 6673 (1921). For a discussion of House and Senate debates, see
Milton, Logan & Tallant, The Traveling Taxpayer: A Rational Framework/or his
Deductions, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 119 (1976).
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rent section 162(a)(2) was reenacted without change or further explana-
tion in the 193914 and 195415 Internal Revenue Codes.
B. Judicial Interpretation
The legislative intent regarding the use of the word home, as it
appears in the federal tax statutes allowing deductions for business
travel expenses, has been the subject of much litigation. 16 The need for
judicial intervention stems from a 1927 Board of Tax Appeals" 7 deci-
sion, Bix/er v. Commissioner, 18 which adopted a nontraditional mean-
ing of the word home in stating that traveling expenses were to be
allowed while a taxpayer was away from his "post of duty" or "place of
employment."' 9  This definition of home as one's principal place of
business has become known as the tax home concept. 2' Although the
Commissioner and the tax court, since Bixier, have consistently main-
tained that home refers to the taxpayer's principal place of business,
21
the judicial interpretation of the word remains unsettled.
The controversy had its origin in the federal courts of appeals. In
1945, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the Commis-
sioner's interpretation of tax home in Barnhill v. Commissioner. 2 2 In
this case, Judge Barnhill was elected to the state supreme court located
in Raleigh, North Carolina, the state capitol, but maintained his pre-
election residence in another city. He was denied traveling and living
14. I.R.C. § 23 (a)(l) (1939).
15. I.R.C. § 162 (a)(2) (1954). In 1962, Congress again amended the provision to limit
business travel expenses to those which are not lavish and extravagant. Revenue
Act of 1962, § 4(b), 76 Stat. 976-77.
16. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
17. The United States Board of Tax Appealswas retitled the Tax Court of the United
States by the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a),(b), 56 Stat. 957.
18. 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927).
19. Id at 1184.
20. The ostensible purpose of employing home as a term of art rather than in its
common usage was to prevent the deduction of commuting expenses. Deductions
for personal, living or family expenses have expressly been prohibited by I.R.C.
§ 262. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the terms traveling ex-
penses, transportation expenses, and commuting expenses prior to any further
discussion of I.R.C. § 162 (1981). Traveling expenses include the cost of any mode
of transportation, meals and lodging, and any incidentals such as rental of sample
rooms, telephones, stenographic services, baggage claims and reasonable tips.
I.R.S. Pub. No. 17, at 62 (rev. Nov. 1981)(available through local I.R.S. Service
Centers). Transportation expenses include fares of all kinds such as air, rail, bus,
taxi and the operation of an auto used for business purposes. Id at 64-66. Com-
muting expenses refer to local transportation costs arising from traveling between
a taxpayer's residence and regular place of business. Id at 64. For a general
discussion of traveling expenses, see 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §§ 25.91-.100 (rev. ed. 1979); Haddleton, Traveling Expenses "Away
From Home, " 49 VA. L. REV. 125 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commissoner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263, 1265, T.C.M. (P-H)
80,082 (1980); Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B.
60.
22. 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945).
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expenses while attending court in Raleigh, since the capitol was
deemed his principal place of business and he was not away from home
while there.23 The Fourth Circuit felt that if home were to mean resi-
dence, commuter's fares could be deductible as expenses incurred
"while away from home." The court concluded, therefore, that home
meant the general locality where a taxpayer lived and worked, but did
not go so far as to state that home and principal place of business were
24synonymous. Just fifteen days earlier, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit had rejected the tax home concept in Commissioner v.
Flowers. 25 Flowers was an attorney for a railroad company having its
principal place of business in Mobile, Alabama. Flowers lived in Jack-
son, Mississippi and maintained an office there from which he per-
formed most of his duties with respect to the railroad's business. The
Fifth Circuit reversed the tax court's holding that Mobile was Flowers'
tax home and applied the common usage of the word home to mean
residence, thereby allowing travel expenses to and within the city of
Mobile. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1946,26 noting that
the meaning of the word home as it applied to a taxpayer living in one
city and working in another had "engendered much difficulty and liti-
gation."27 The Court went on to acknowledge both the tax court and
administrative rulings that defined home as the equivalent of principal
place of business. However, the opinion neither approved nor disap-
proved of the tax court's definition, but rather reversed the Fifth Cir-
cuit on the ground that Flowers' traveling expenses were not incurred
as a result of the business needs of his employer. 2' The dissent, how-
ever, argued that Congress did not intend home to mean business
headquarters.29
While Flowers did not end the tax home debate, the decision did
discuss and clarify the language used in the Code by explaining the
three prerequisites that must be satisfied in order to deduct traveling
expenses.30  The test as set forth by the Court in Flowers is: (1) the
expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling expense, as that
term is generally understood;3 (2) the expense must be incurred while
23. Id at 917.
24. Id While the Fourth Circuit has refused to hold home and principal place of
business as synonymous, the "the same general locality" language finds the same
result as the Commissioner's traditional analysis.
25. 148 F.2d 163, 164 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'don other grounds, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
26. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
27. Id at 471-72.
28. Id at 472.
29. Id at 497-80 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justice recognized that the
definition of home was aimed at preventing the deduction of commuting ex-
penses, but did not believe the expenses incurred by Flowers could be regarded as
such.
30. Id at 470.
31. This includes such items as transportation fares, food, and lodging expenses in-
curred while traveling. Id
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away from home; and (3) the expense must be incurred in pursuit of
business.32 Thus, the Court in Flowers deemphasized the meaning of
the word home and looked instead to the relationship between the ex-
penses incurred and the exigencies of the employer's business. Flowers
remains the leading case in interpreting section 162(a)(2) traveling ex-
pense deductions largely because the Supreme Court declined on two
other occasions to clarify the term "tax home" 33 and because the circuit
courts remain in conflict.34
C. Traditional Tax Home Analysis
Of all the occupations requiring frequent travel, it seems the
outside sales representative 35 stands to be dealt the harshest treatment
by the federal tax laws since the nature of this work requires duplica-
tion of living expenses. It was this inequitable treatment that Congress
sought to remedy with the Revenue Act of 1921 by amending the ex-
isting Internal Revenue Code to provide a "measure of justice" for the
commercial traveler.36 Outside salespersons who work as employees
may deduct the unreimbursed expenses of soliciting business for their
employers,37 but in all cases such unreimbursed traveling expense de-
ductions must meet the requirements of section 162, as construed in
Flowers.38 However, in order to establish a point of origin for comput-
32. This means that there must be a direct connection between the expenditure and
the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or of his employer. More-
over, such an expenditure must be necessary or appropriate to the development
and pursuit of the business or trade. Id
33. Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 292 (1967) (Commissioner's definition will
apply in the context of the military taxpayer); Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S.
59, 61 (1958) (court of appeals made a fair assessment of the record and Supreme
Court will not intervene).
34. Only the Second Circuit has consistently interpreted home as place of residence.
Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971). The following cases have also been decided giving the word home its
common usage: Brandl v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1975);
United States v. LeBlanc, 278 F.2d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 1960); Commissioner v.
Janss, 260 F.2d 99, 102-03 (8th Cir. 1958); Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d
407, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1944). More frequently, circuit courts have accepted the tax
home doctrine. See Chimento v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 643, 644 (3d. Cir. 1971);
Jenkins v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1292, 1293 (8th Cir. 1969); Wills v. Commis-
sioner, 411 F.2d 537, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1969); Commissioner v. Mooneyham, 404
F.2d 522, 527-28 (6th Cir. 1968); England v. United States, 345 F.2d 414, 417 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966); Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d
496, 503 (5th Cir. 1964); Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1952); Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913, 917
(4th Cir. 1945). For the purposes of this casenote, therefore, the Commissioner's
definition of home as principal place of business will be considered the majority
view.
35. The I.R.S. has defined outside sales representative as one who does selling away
from the employer's headquarters. Rev. Rul. 62-85, 1962-1 C.B. 13.
36. 61 CONG. REC. 5201 (1921).
37. Rev. Rul. 62-85, 1962-1 C.B. 13.
38. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
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ing traveling expenses "while away from home" and to determine the
deductibility of meals and lodging, the existence of a principal place of
business or post of duty must be established.3 9 Locating the site of the
taxpayer's place of business also permits a determination of whether
transportation costs are incurred for business or personal reasons.
A taxpayer's place of business is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by particular circumstances.4" For an individual with a single
place of employment, defining the principal place of business presents
no difficulty. Absent a particular building or terminal at which the tax-
payer actually performs job duties, the principal place of business may
be regarded as the employee's business headquarters or center of busi-
ness activities.4 In addition, since the principal place of business may
include the entire city or general geographic area where the taxpayer
usually carries on his or her trade,42 a traveling salesperson is still con-
sidered to be inside the area of business activity anywhere within a
reasonable commuting distance from the place of business. 43 Trans-
portation expenses between business appointments or posts of duty
within the general tax home area are deductible, but meals, lodging,
and commuting expenses are not.44
1. Office in Residence
In situations where a sales representative maintains an office in his
or her residence and travels to a legitimate business appointment from
there, the transportation costs incurred in excess of those computed us-
ing the principal place of business as the point of departure are nonde-
ductible commuting expenses.45 Unless a taxpayer can prove the office
in the residence is the principal place of business46 or a minor post of
duty,47 any traveling expenses incurred using the residence office as the
point of departure will fail the business exigency requirement of the
Flowers' analysis.48
2. Multiple Business Locations
A more detailed analysis is required when the outside salesperson
39. Johnson v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1261 (1952), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 2.
40. Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60, 61.
41. Id at 62 (railroad employees). See also Rev. Rul. 55-235, 1955-1 C.B. 274 (fisher-
men); Rev. Rul. 55-236, 1955-1 C.B. 274 (truck drivers).
42. Rev. Rul. 56-49, 1956-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 C.B. 261.
43. Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583, 585-86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
926 (1952); Bell v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 344, 349-50 (1949), acq., 1949-2 C.B. 1.
44. Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955); Denman v. Commis-
sioner, 48 T.C. 439 (1967); Sherman v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 332, 337-38 (1959),
acq., 1951-2 C.B. 4.
45. Matteson v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1975); Green v. Commissioner,
298 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1962).
46. Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980).
47. Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60.
48. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
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is soliciting business at two or more locations and exigencies of the oc-
cupation require the salesperson to spend a substantial amount of time
at each of these locations. Again, the individual's tax home is deemed
to be the site of the principal place of business or regular post of duty
during the tax year 9 while the other places where work is performed
are considered minor posts of duty. A taxpayer may deduct transporta-
tion expenses between the principal place of business and minor posts5 °
and may also deduct the cost of meals and lodging if the trip requires
sleep or rest.5 '
There are situations when it is difficult to distinguish which of a
salesperson's posts of duty should be considered the principal place for
tax home purposes. The Internal Revenue Service and the courts have
set forth the more important factors to be considered, including the
total time ordinarily spent at each of the business posts, the degree of
business activity, and the amount of financial return from each post.
Although no single factor is determinative, the revenue rulings give
great weight to the amount of financial return,52 while the courts are
more apt to determine principal place of business as a function of the
amount of time spent at a given location.53 If the time spent at each
location is substantially equal, the courts will locate the tax home at the
business site closest to the taxpayer's residence. 54
3. No Principal Place of Business
There is considerable conflict reflected in the tax court decisions
regarding alternative sites to be used as a tax home when an outside
sales representative is determined to have no principal place of busi-
ness. The tax court has allowed the tax home of a salesperson in con-
stant travel status to be located at the headquarter city of the
employer's business55 or the sales representative's permanent resi-
49. Rev. Rul. 61-67, 1961-1 C.B. 24, modifed, Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86.
50. Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60. If a taxpayer's home is located at the minor
post of duty, the deduction is limited to that part of the family's expenses attribu-
table to the taxpayer's presence there while actually performing business duties.
Id. See also Mazzotta v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 427, 429 (1971), afj'dper curiam,
465 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1972)(deductions disallowed when reason for returning to
residence is personal, even though some minor business was performed); Hicks v.
Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 1088, 1090-91, T.C.M. (P-H) 50,292 (1950)
(court will apportion such travel expenses between personal and business).
51. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
52. Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-55 C.B. 51, modifled, Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86.
53. Folkman v. United States, 615 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1980); Markey v. Commis-
sioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1252 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Foote v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 1, 3-4 (1976); Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 561-65 (1968); Green v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 764 (1961), aft'd, 298 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1962); Sherman v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 332 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 4.
54. Puckett v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1092 (1971), acq., 1971-2 C.B. 3; Brown v.
Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 832 (1928), acq., VIII - 1 C.B. 6 (1929).
55. Sapson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 636 (1968), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 3 (company head-
quarters in San Antonio considered salesman's tax home where he paid $50
[Vol. 11
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dence.56 Travel deductions have been denied completely, however, in
cases where the taxpayer had no established "home," defined either as
residence or business, from which to be away.57
IV. DALY v. COMMISSIONER: TAX COURT AND FOURTH
CIRCUIT HOLDINGS
A. Tax Court Treatment
Sustaining the Commissioner's ruling, the tax court determined
that Daly's traveling expense deductions must be disallowed.58 The
court summarized the purpose of the "away from home" deduction as
mitigating the burden of the taxpayer who must incur duplicate living
expenses because of the exigencies of his or her business. With this in
mind, the court sought to determine whether Daly's duplicate living
expenses resulted from the needs of his employer or from his personal
desire to maintain a residence in Virginia. 9 The court concluded that
the petitioner had only personal reasons for maintaining his residence
completely outside of his sales territory and that the additional travel
and living expenses incurred were "unnecessary and inappropriate" to
his employer's business.6"
Considering Philadelphia as Daly's place of business, although he
maintained no base of operations there, the court concluded that Daly
month for a room there); Smith v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 837, T.C.M.
(P-H) 43,438 (1943)(taxpayer without permanent residence could deduct travel
expenses while away from company office which was his business headquarters).
56. Dean v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 663 (1970), acq., 1970-2 C.B. XIX. The taxpayer
must be able to substantiate a permanent residence by showing sums expended for
continuing living expenses. Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 C.B. 37. See also Rambo v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 920 (1978), acq. in result, 1979-2 C.B. 2; Brenner v. Com-
missioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1210, T.C.M. (P-H) 67,239 (1967). But cf. Hicks v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 71 (1966) (spending 2 weeks and $100 at parents' resi-
dence was insufficient to establish a tax home there).
57. Duncan v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1088 (1929), affidper curiam, 47 F.2d 1082
(2d Cir. 1931). One of the first salesmen to be denied travel deductions based on
the tax home doctrine was Charles Duncan. Duncan worked on a roving commis-
sion basis and paid his own expenses. He claimed residence at a hotel in Buffalo,
New York, where he occasionally rented a room, and paid his income taxes from
that state. He had no fixed business headquarters. His wife would join Duncan in
Buffalo from time to time but spent most of the year in a health spa in Missouri.
The court disallowed Duncan's deductions for transportation, meals and lodging,
indicating that a traveling salesman cannot be "away from home" unless he main-
tained a permanent headquarters, either in a business or residential sense. Id at
1091. See also Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 864 (1971). But cf Gustafson v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 998 (1944), non-
acq., 1973-2 C.B. 4 (similar fact situation but tax home deemed to be place of
residence).
58. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
59. Id at 195.
60. Id See also Hantzis v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 248 (lst Cir. 1981) (law student,
pursuing summer employment away from Boston, where she usually resided, was
not away from home for the purpose of travel deductions because she had no
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was not "away from home" when he was in the vicinity of that city and
that travel expenses, including food and lodging on overnight trips,
would not have been necessary if Philadelphia, rather than McLean,
were used as a point of departure.6" Furthermore, Daly's stated reason
for maintaining his residence in McLean was to allow his wife to keep
her Washington, D.C. job and to avoid the inconvenience of relocat-
ing.62 These reasons were unrelated to the business of the Myrtle Desk
Company, making the travel expenses personal and nondeductible.63
Additionally, the court dismissed the petitioner's reliance on a revenue
ruling dealing with traveling salesmen since there was no contention
under the instant facts that Daly was an itinerant in constant travel
status.64
business connection to Boston; her reasons for maintaining a residence there were
personal).
The tax court reached its conclusion as to Daly by analyzing the location and
frequency of the 134 trips he made during the tax year in question. Daly visited
Philadelphia, at a distance of 133 miles from McLean, 17 times, more often than
any other city. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 191-92 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d
351 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). A total of 28
cities were visited on a minimum of two occasions. (This included five trips to
Chicago and three to company headquarters in North Carolina. The Commis-
sioner conceded deductibility of expenses for these trips so they will not be in-
cluded in further discussion. Id at nn. 2 & 3). The tax court noted that the record
did not indicate the duration of the visits to the 28 cities, but Daly's weekly stay in
his territory was for two nights. Id at 192 n. 1. Computing the aggregate distance
between McLean and the cities within Daly's tri-state territory at 3,744 miles, the
court found the distance between Philadelphia and the same cities to be only 1,518
miles. Id at 193. These figures do not reflect the number of trips to each location
which would make the disparity in mileage even greater. In seeking to determine
the petitioner's principal place of employment, the court observed the high per-
centage of trips to locations in or around Philadelphia. Of 126 trips to the sales
territory, 44% were within 28 miles of the metropolitan Philadelphia area, 66%
were within 54 miles of Philadelphia and 80% were within 88 miles of Philadel-
phia. In contrast, only 7 out of 126 sales trips - 6% - were to locations within 85
miles of McLean. Id at 195-96. It was noted that Daly performed job-related
work on 72 occasions at his McLean residence during 1975, although he was not
required by his employer to maintain an office at any location. Id at 193. Relying
on Daly's own testimony that selling is 85% of the job, the court found the fact
that 15% of the non-sales related work was performed in what it labeled the "so-
called" office in McLean was of little consequence. Id at 196. Philadelphia was,
therefore, characterized as the center of the petitioner's commission-producing ac-
tivities. Id See generally Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir.
1969); Wills v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1969); Green v. Commis-
sioner, 298 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1962); Gardin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1079
(1975).
61. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 195 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
62. Id at 194.
63. See, e.g., Mazzotta v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1972); Smith v. War-
ren, 388 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1968).
64. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 197 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Daly was relying on Rev.
Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 C.B. 37.
Daly v. Commissioner
B. Fourth Circuit Panel Treatment
On appeal by the taxpayers, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found the tax court's decision to be erroneous. The panel re-
versed for the reason that Daly did not have a principal place of busi-
ness or a tax home in Philadelphia since he maintained no means of
conducting his business in that geographic area.6" The appellate court
distinguished Daly from other cases cited by the Commissioner in that
all other taxpayers maintained a residence in one city and an office or
place of business in another.66 The court of appeals relied principally
on a 1960 Nebraska district court opinion, Schreiner v. McCrory,67
which criticized Flowers as imposing, contrary to the intent of Con-
gress, a penalty on salespersons who travel in pursuit of their em-
ployer's business. The Fourth Circuit held that the concentration of
Daly's income-producing activity was, by itself, insufficient to establish
Philadelphia as a principal place of business for purposes of section
162(a)(2). In the absence of a principal place of business, Daly became
entitled to designate his residence in Virginia as his tax home.68 The
court of appeals dismissed, in a footnoted sentence, the fact that
Schreiner's residence was within his sales territory while Daly's was
not.69 The appellate court concluded that the distinction was unimpor-
tant since the Commissioner was looking specifically at the site of the
concentration of income-producing activity within the territory and
nothing more.
Circuit Judge Sprouse dissented, pointing out that the Fourth Cir-
cuit had consistently construed "tax home" by reference to the general
locus of the taxpayer's place of employment. 70 The dissent stated that
the fact that Daly's principal place of business could not be defined by
a fixed office site should not have eliminated the critical inquiry into
the reason for the travel expenses. Thus, Judge Sprouse would have
denied the deduction under the third condition of the Flowers' test, as
65. Daly v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
66. Id at 353. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946) (business in
Mobile, Ala. and residence in Jackson, Miss.); Green v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d
890, 891 (6th Cir. 1962)(residence and home office in Greenville, Ohio and an-
swering service and mail delivery in Dayton, Ohio).
67. 186 F. Supp. 819 (D. Neb. 1960). Schreiner was a salesman assigned to a five state
territory in which he sold insurance. The Commissioner contended that Denver,
Colo. was Schreiner's tax home since it was the center of his income-producing
activities, although, like Daly, the salesman maintained no office or similar place
of business there. The Nebraska district court disagreed with the Commissioner
and found Omaha, Neb., Schreiner's residence, to be his tax home. Id at 823.
68. Daly v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
69. Id at 353 n.3.
70. Id at 355 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Babeaux v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d
730 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Waldrop v. Commissioner, 444 U.S. 993
(1979); Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957), affdper curiam,
358 U.S. 59 (1958); Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945).
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an expense motivated by personal preference rather than business exi-
gency. He argued that Congress did not intend to subsidize the life
style of a taxpayer who, for example, resides in the Caribbean and trav-
els to his sales territory in the northeast simply because he does not
have a place of business at a fixed location.7
C En Banc Treatment
On petition of the Commissioner from the divided opinion of the
court of appeals, the case was reheard by the court sitting en banc. The
judgment of the appellate court was reversed, disallowing Daly's trans-
portation expenses between McLean and Philadelphia, and meals and
lodging while in the Philadelphia area.72 The nine member en banc
court concluded that these expenses were incurred for personal reasons
and, citing Flowers, that they were unnecessary to the conduct of the
employer's business.73
A concurring opinion to the en banc decision raised an interesting
policy consideration as to dual-wage earner situations involving
couples such as the Dalys. Judge Murnaghan called for congressional,
rather than judicial, determination of the role one working spouse's sit-
uation should play in locating the other spouse's tax home. ' He felt
the Dalys were caught in an inequitable position in that Mrs. Daly's
employment justified maintaining the family residence in the Washing-
ton area as much as her husband's employment would have justified a
move to Philadelphia. While no solution was tendered, Judge
Murnaghan urged that such taxpayers be allowed to approach tax is-
sues on a partnership or joint venture basis.75
V. ANALYSIS
A. Locating the Tax Home
Daly seems to have been logically settled by the Fourth Circuit en
banc relying on the traditional tax home analysis of Flowers, disallow-
ing travel expenses which were incurred for personal and nonbusiness
71. Daly v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1980)(Sprouse, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). See also Bunevith v. Commissioner,
52 T.C. 837, qff'd by unpublished order, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 935 (1st Cir.
1970)(school lunch official could not deduct travel expenses from residence
outside of assigned work area even though he had no fixed station within assigned
area); Gilberg v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 611 (1971)(defense department field au-
ditor disallowed transportation expenses from home outside assigned region to
job sites within region).
72. Daly v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981)(en banc).
73. 1d at 255. In addition to being bound by the Flowers precedent, the en banc
opinion noted that the court was bound by stare decisis of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. See note 71 and accompanying text supra. It is interesting
to note that Judge Sprouse, who wrote the reversing opinion for the en banc deci-
sion, raised the stare decisis issue in his earlier dissent to the panel opinion.
74. Daly v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1981)(en banc)(Murnaghan,
J., concurring).
75. Id
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related reasons.76 The Daly opinions do, however, point to the confu-
sion inherent in treating a place of business as a home for tax purposes.
Although the tax court and the Fourth Circuit had no reason to provide
guidance for outside salespersons beyond what was necessary to decide
this case, the arbitrary method used to designate Daly's "center of in-
come-producing activities" confuses an already fictionalized concept.
The difficulty exhibited by the courts in construing the "away from
home" requirement of section 162 supports the suggestion that the time
has come for Congress to address policy questions critical to commer-
cial travelers like Daly.77
Daly maintained no office or otherwise identifiable base of opera-
tions within his tri-state territory. In cases of multiple business loca-
tions, the analysis of "away from home" deductions requires that the
principal place of business be distinguished from other minor posts of
duty.78 Yet, in characterizing Philadelphia as the center of Daly's com-
mission-producing activities, none of the courts reviewing this case re-
lied on the traditional factors such as the amount of time spent,
business activity, or financial return at each location.7 9 The tax court
noted that the record did not disclose facts such as the amount of in-
come derived from the various cities within the territory nor the
amount of time spent at alternate locations.80 In characterizing Phila-
delphia as Daly's tax home, the tax court seemed to base its decision on
the frequency of trips to that metropolitan area.8 Without looking to
additional factors, the tax court's holding is far from persuasive since
only sixty-six percent of Daly's trips were to within fifty-four miles of
Philadelphia.
Since Philadelphia was determined as the center of Daly's business
activities, meal and lodging expenses would be disallowed while in the
Philadelphia "area" or to the extent they would not have been incurred
using that city as a point of departure.8 2 However, in order to compute
"away from home" deductions, it is necessary to know where the tax
home ends and the deductible area begins. Surprisingly, neither the
Commissioner nor the courts have established a fixed radius from the
principal place of business within which no travel expenses are deducti-
ble. Unlike some determinations which need to be considered in light
of particular circumstances, the radius of the tax home area should be
76. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
77. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra. It is doubtful that Daly would be re-
garded as having no principal place of business since he had been assigned to the
same territory for over 10 years. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 191 (1979),
rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
79. See text accompanying notes 52-53.
80. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 192 n.l (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
81. See note 60 supra.
82. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 196-97 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
19821
Baltimore Law Review
fixed and applied equally to all taxpayers.83
The tax court and the Fourth Circuit en banc were obviously re-
luctant to bring Daly under one of the exceptions to the tax home rule,
fearing, perhaps, a flotilla of Caribbean commuters. It was unneces-
sary, however, to strain the principal place of business analysis by
designating Philadelphia as Daly's tax home. The courts could have
followed precedent in holding that when the time spent at multiple
business locations is substantially equal, the tax home is the business
location closest to the taxpayer's residence.84 For a taxpayer such as
Daly, or even the ficticious Caribbean commuter, ordinary commuting
expenses incurred as a result of a personal decision to live outside the
territory would be nondeductible,85 but the tax home would remain at
the business location within the territory closest to the salesperson's res-
idence. The advantage to Daly and his colleagues, as well as to those
responsible for the administration of the tax laws, would be that com-
muting expenses would end and travel expenses begin at a fixed point
rather than at an ever-shifting and ill-defined "home," with tax results
being essentially the same.8 6
B. The Effect on Working Couples
There is a policy consideration in Daly regarding the role one
spouse's legitimate employment considerations should play in deter-
mining where the other spouse's tax home will be. The problem arises
because of two conflicting assumptions made by the federal tax laws
concerning work and marriage. Barnhil v. Commissioner87 is often
cited for the fundamental belief inherent in our system of taxation that
83. It would appear that a 50 mile radius from the tax home would be in line with
other governmental policies allowing per diem expenses for federal and contrac-
tual employees away from home on temporary assignments. Hudson v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1462, T.C.M. (P-H) 75,336 (1975).
84. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
85. See, e.g., notes 68 and 72 and accompanying text supra.
86. For example, Hanover, Pennsylvania is the site within Daly's territory closest to
McLean, 80 miles away. Assuming the tax home radius for all taxpayers to be
fixed at 50 miles, Daly would have to drive 30 commuting miles from his resi-
dence in McLean before entering his tax home radius. Daly's nondeductible mile-
age would include the 50 mile radius of his tax home plus the 30 miles he would
have to drive to get there, totalling 80 nondeductible miles. Expenses incurred
traveling in excess of 80 miles from Daly's residence would therefore be deducti-
ble as being "away from home." On a sales trip to Philadelphia, at a distance of
133 miles from McLean, Daly would be able to deduct 53 miles as a transporta-
tion expense, as well as overnight meals and lodging if required. The tax court
computed the aggregate number of miles from Philadelphia to all of the cities
visited during the tax year in question as 1,518. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
190, 193 (1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir.
1981) (en banc). The aggregate distance from McLean, deducting 80 commuting
miles from each trip, is 1,576 miles. The tax consequences remain virtually un-
changed while enhanced administration is assured using the fixed tax home radius
concept.
87. 148 F.2d 913, 917 (4th Cir. 1945).
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a business person will live in reasonable proximity to his place of em-
ployment. It has also been stated that our tax laws have developed on
the assumption of a common marital domicile, with employment con-
cerns resolved accordingly 8 s Thus, the system assumes a husband and
wife will live together and near their source of income. Obviously, with
the advent of the two wage-earner family, a "tax unit" 89 must make a
less than voluntary choice of locating the abode at a reasonable dis-
tance from both tax homes.
Writers have suggested alternatives to the tax treatment of work-
ing couples like the Dalys. The Internal Revenue Service has been
urged to adopt a tax home rule based on the principal place of resi-
dence, rather than the principal place of business,9" or to adapt the reg-
ular/minor post of employment rule to a working husband and wife.9 '
It has also been suggested that the Internal Revenue Service expand the
temporary employment exception to allow working couples reasonable
time to obtain more conveniently situated employment or to relocate
the residence.92 The courts, however, have consistently held that a hus-
band and wife each have a separate tax home at his or her principal
place of business. 93 While recognizing the burden of added commut-
ing expenses imposed on working couples, the tax court continues to
find the nature of the expenditures to be personal and therefore
88. Chwalow v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1972).
89. Tax unit is a term used to describe a husband and wife filing jointly. Tax Incentive
Act of 1981." Report of the Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. REP. No. 4242,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1981).
90. Milton, Logan & Tallant, The Traveling Taxpayer.- A Rational Framework/or his
Deductions, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 119, 141 (1976).
91. Popkin, Deduction of Traveling Expenses by the Two- Worker Family - An Inquiry
into the Role of the Courts in InterFreting the Federal Tax Law, 55 TEX. L. REV.
645, 659-60 (1977).
92. Dobbs, Daly v. Commissioner: Effect of the Tax Home Rule Under Section 162
on Two-Earner Families, 34 TAX LAWYER 829, 843 (1981). A taxpayer who works
at a temporary place of employment at a distance from his residence may be con-
sidered "away from home" for purposes of section 162(a)(2). Commissioner v.
Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957). Employment is temporary if it can be ex-
pected to last for only a short period of time. Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
783, 786 (1971). There have been cases where salespersons who had assigned ter-
ritories but worked in each location within the territory on a roving basis were
held to come under the "temporary" exception to the tax home rule. Schreiner v.
McCrory, 186 F. Supp. 819 (D. Neb. 1960); Sapson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 636
(1968), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 3; Gustafson v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 998 (1944), non-
acq., 1973-2 C.B. 4. The failure of the court of appeals to consider the temporary
nature of Daly's employment is partially the result of a procedural deficiency.
The petitioner did not raise this argument until appeal, thus precluding considera-
tion of the issue. Brief for Appellant at 14, Daly v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 351
(4th Cir. 1980).
93. Coerver v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1962)(per curiam)(filing of joint
return did not create taxable unit with only one tax home); Hammond v. Commis-
sioner, 213 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1954) (husband and wife do not constitute a




Daly v. Commissioner95 stands as an example of the confusion inher-
ent in treating a place of business as a home for tax purposes, particu-
larly when the taxpayer is a commercial traveler. Although this case
could have been readily decided on the basis of personal expense exclu-
sions, the arbitrary method used to find Daly's center of commission-
producing activities expands the already fictionalized concept of a tax
home. Until the inequities of the tax laws are corrected by Congress,
the burden on traveling salespersons and their spouses would be less-
ened by guidance from the Commissioner or the courts as to where or
how a nontraditional tax home will be located for purposes of comput-
ing "away from home" deductions. A simple solution would be to al-
low a traveling salesperson to consider his or her tax home as the
business location closest to the residence, when there is no other way to
distinguish the principal place of business activity. A traveling tax-
payer and spouse cannot make a reasonable determination of where to
locate their abode or office until they know where their tax home is apt
to be assigned by the tax laws.
Rita Linder Blundo
94. Foote v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1, 6 (1976). The concurrence to the en banc Daly
opinion called for comprehensive congressional action to remedy this inequity.
Daly v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(Murnaghan, J., concurring). Congress did recently consider the "marriage pen-
alty" in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, ch. 4, § 103, 95 Stat. 172, and
noted that in addition to being taxed at a higher rate, two-wage earner couples
have more expenses, such as added transportation costs. Tax Incentive Act of
1981. Report of the Committee on Finance, S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29-30 (1981). Congressional response has been to allow married couples a
new deduction equal to a percentage of the earnings of the spouse with the lower
income. I.R.C. § 221 (1981). Congress sees this as a major step towards its goal of
eliminating the marriage penalty entirely, but has declined to act regarding the
penalties imposed by the traditional tax home concept.
95. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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